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In Back to First Principles: A New Model for the Regulation of Drug Promotion, Alan
Bennett and co-authors rightly argue that it is time for the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) to reconsider its scheme for regulating prescription drug
promotion.1 Bennett and his co-authors assert that the FDA’s framework for oversee-
ing prescriptiondrug promotion is outdated because itwas developedover 50 years ago
when communication techniques and technologies, and First Amendment jurispru-
dence regarding protections for commercial speech, were appreciably different.2 In-
deed, as Bennett and colleagues note, the FDA itself appears to agree that change, or at
least clarification, may be warranted. For example, in recent years, the FDA has held or
announced public meetings to solicit stakeholder input, announced a number of stud-
ies of drug promotion, and has issued several draft guidance documents intended to
clarify certain aspects of its regulation of prescription drug promotion.3
Bennett and colleagues propose a ‘New Model’ to modernize the FDA’s regula-
tory scheme. The New Model would create three categories of drug manufacturer
† Patricia J. Zettler is an associate professor atGeorgia StateUniversityCollege of Law. She served as an attorney
in the Office of the Chief Counsel at the U.S. Food and Drug Administration from 2009 to 2013.
1 Alan Bennett et al., Back to First Principles: A New Model for Drug Promotion, 2 J. LAW BIOSCI. 168, 169–70
(2015).
2 Id.
3 See eg Notice of Public Hearing: Promotion of FDA-Regulated Medical Products Using the Internet and So-
cial Media Tools, 74 Fed. Reg. 48,083 (Sept. 21, 2009); Bennett et al., supra note 1, at 186, 189; Toni
Clark, Under Pressure, FDA to Hold Public Meeting on Off-Label Use, REUTERS (May 6, 2015), http://www.
reuters.com/article/2015/05/07/us-fda-pharmaceuticals-constitution-idUSKBN0NS00F20150507;
Alexander Gaffney, Is FDA Laying the Groundwork for a Broad Shift in the Way It Regulates DTC Drug Adver-
tising?, REG. AFF. PROFF. SOC’Y (Dec. 2, 2013), http://www.raps.org/focus-online/news/news-article-view/
article/4372/is-fda-laying-the-groundwork-for-a-broad-shift-in-the-way-it-regulates-dtc-drug.aspx.
C© The Author 2015. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Duke University School of Law,
Harvard Law School, Oxford University Press, and Stanford Law School. This is an Open Access arti-
cle distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial reproduction and distri-
bution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any way, and that
the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact journals.permissions@oup.com
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2  Regulating drug promotion to promote the public health
communications—(1) Scientific Exchange and Other Exempt Communications, (2)
Non-Core Communications, and (3) Core Communications—with the first category
being exempt from FDA oversight, the second subject to some FDA oversight, and
the third category subject to the most stringent FDA oversight.4 The New Model is
intended to address concerns that the FDA’s current regulatory scheme violates the
First Amendment rights of drug manufacturers, to establish clear rules for drug man-
ufacturers, and to serve the FDA’s public health mission—by increasing the amount
of accurate information about drugs available to the public, maintaining the integrity
of the FDA’s approval process, and maintaining incentives for drug manufacturers to
study new uses of their products.5
I agree with Bennett and colleagues that these are key goals for any reform to FDA
oversight of prescription drug promotion, and their New Model is a thoughtful pro-
posal to achieve these goals. But, leaving aside the obviously important question of
whether the New Model would, in fact, address concerns that the FDA’s regulatory
scheme violates drug manufacturers’ First Amendment rights,6 this commentary ex-
plores whether the New Model would serve its other aims of providing clear rules for
drug manufacturers and serving the public health. To that end, I raise some questions
about whether the New Model would accomplish those two aims, primarily focusing
on the proposal to categorically exempt scientific and certain other communications
from FDA oversight.
As a preliminary matter, whatever one thinks of the substance of the FDA’s current
regulatory scheme, it arguably is not the case that the FDA’s existing requirements are
generally unclear to drug manufacturers. As Bennett and co-authors note, the FDA’s
requirements have been in place for over 50 years, giving drugmanufacturers extensive
experience with how the FDA interprets and implements those requirements. Addi-
tionally, it does not appear that the FDA identifies an overwhelming number of viola-
tions in this area, which might be expected if there were widespread misunderstanding
of the FDA’s requirements. In 2014, the FDA’s Office of PrescriptionDrug Promotion
(OPDP) sent only 10warning or untitled letters.7 Even considering the higher number
ofOPDPwarning and untitled letters in previous years (eg 24 in 2013, and 28 in 2012),
the number of FDA actions is not particularly high when compared to the number of
drugs that are marketed, and the estimated 27 billion dollars that the pharmaceutical
4 See Bennett et al., supra note 1, at 202, 212.
5 See id. at 190.
6 It is worth noting that in the short time since Bennett et al.’s article was published, there have been some legal
developments with respect to the First Amendment and FDA regulation of drug promotion. See eg Amarin
Pharma Inc. v. FDA, No. 15-CV-03588 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2015).
7 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Warning Letters and Notice of Violation Letters to Pharmaceutical Companies,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/EnforcementActivitiesbyFDA/
WarningLettersandNoticeofViolationLetterstoPharmaceuticalCompanies/default.htm [hereinafter ‘FDA
Warning Letters’]. A warning letter is an ‘informal and advisory’ communication that is not a final
agency action, which the FDA sends to firms to give them an opportunity to voluntarily correct viola-
tions of the law. The FDA sends a warning letter for violations ‘of regulatory significance’. An untitled
letter is similar to a warning letter, but is sent when violations ‘do not meet the threshold of regu-
latory significance’. Accordingly warning and untitled letters are advisory rather than enforcement
actions—but they do provide a means to gauge how many violations of the law the FDA has identi-
fied. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., REGULATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL §§ 4-1, 4-2 (2015), available at
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/ComplianceManuals/RegulatoryProceduresManual/default.htm.
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Regulating drug promotion to promote the public health  3
industry spends yearly on drug promotion.8 Of course, the relatively low number of
identified violations might demonstrate that the FDA lacks resources to enforce its re-
quirements, that the FDA has grown more cautious in enforcing its drug promotion
requirements in light of recent First Amendment decisions, or that industry speech is
broadly chilled by confusion about FDA requirements. But another implication might
be that there is not much confusion within industry about what the FDA requires.
That said, it likely is less clear to industry how(orwhether) theFDA intends to revise
its requirements to explicitly address developments inFirstAmendment jurisprudence.
It also may not be obvious how the FDA intends to apply its requirements to relatively
new forms of communication, like social media, for which there is limited regulatory
history to instruct stakeholders. Assuming that the FDA’s current scheme is unclear—
either generally, or in specific, but important, contexts such as social media—the ques-
tion, then, is would the NewModel provide more clarity than what currently exists.
Bennett and colleagues note that ‘scientific exchange’ is one category of com-
munications that already exists in the FDA’s regulations, but that the FDA has not
provided a specific, binding definition of ‘scientific exchange’.9 Drug manufacturers,
thus, are left to ‘read the tea leaves’.10 But as Bennett and co-authors acknowledge, un-
defined terms exist in many agencies’ regulatory schemes, and, even considering only
the FDA, a lack of specificity is not unique to the drug promotion aspect of the FDA’s
regulatory scheme. Given this, and other commentators’ concerns about the prolifer-
ation of vague standards and non-binding guidance at the FDA and other agencies,11
it is not clear whether creating more categories of communication that would require
the FDA to drawmore lines and establish more definitions, would achieve the authors’
goal of creating certain rules for drugmanufacturers—or would simply createmore tea
leaves for drug manufacturers to read.
Moreover, although Bennett and colleagues have provided a reasonable definition
of what should constitute scientific exchange or otherwise exempt communications,
the FDA may not have provided a general definition of ‘scientific exchange’ because
what constitutes scientific exchange is likely to be highly dependent on the facts of the
particular situation.United States v. Harkonen provides a useful example.12 In that case,
the government prosecuted Dr. Harkonen, the CEO of a drug company, alleging that
8 FDA Warning Letters, supra note 7; The PEW Charitable Trusts, Fact Sheet, Persuading the Prescribers:
Pharmaceutical Industry Marketing and its Influence on Physicians and Patients, http://www.pewtrusts.org/
en/research-and-analysis/fact-sheets/2013/11/11/persuading-the-prescribers-pharmaceutical-industry-
marketing-and-its-influence-on-physicians-and-patients. It is not clear exactly how many brand-name
prescription drugs are currently marketed. But one study estimates that FDA has approved approximately
1400 new molecular entities throughout its history, and, if one includes both brand-name and generic
prescription drugs, the FDA estimates there are currently as many as 22,000 approved drugs. Development
and Distribution of Patient Medication Information for Prescription Drugs; Public Hearing, 75 Fed. Reg.
52,765, 52,766 (Aug. 27, 2010); Michael Kinch et al., An Overview of FDA-Approved New Molecular Entities
1827-2013, 19 DRUG DISCOV. TODAY 1033, 1034 (2014).
9 See Bennett et al., supra note 1, at 186; see also 21 C.F.R. § 312.7(a) (2015) (“This provision is not intended
to restrict the full exchange of scientific information concerning the drug . . .”).
10 Id.
11 See eg Lars Noah, Governance by the Backdoor: Administrative Law(lessness?) at the FDA, 93 NEB. L. REV. 89
(2014); StephenM. Johnson,Good Guidance, Good Grief!, 72 MO. L. REV. 695, 696 (2007).
12 United States v. Harkonen, 510 F. App’x 633, 635 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 824 (2013); see also
Stephanie M. Greene, After Caronia: First Amendment Concerns in Off-Label Promotion, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
645, 684–89 (2014) (describingHarkonen).
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4  Regulating drug promotion to promote the public health
he and others at the company fraudulently misrepresented in a press release the results
of a phase III trial of a new indication for an approved drug.On its face, the press release
looksmuch like scientific exchange. Indeed, the press release did not involve fabricated
or falsified data, nor was the description of the study results objectively false. However,
the study discussed in the press release failed to yield any statistically significant results
for its pre-defined endpoints, and the positive results reported in the press release were
based on unblinded post-hoc analyses. Ultimately, a jury convicted Dr. Harkonen of
wire fraud, and the Ninth Circuit upheld that conviction in an unpublished opinion.
Regardless ofwhether one agrees thatDr.Harkonen shouldhavebeen convicted, his
case demonstrates how fact-intensive an inquiry intowhether a communication consti-
tutes legitimate scientific exchange can be13—and thus how difficult it may be to write
a general definition that can provide significantly greater certainty for industry. Ben-
nett and co-authors might respond that the press release at issue in Harkonen would
not meet their definition of scientific exchange because the limitations of the post-hoc
analyses were not made clear and therefore the information in the press release was
not ‘placed in the appropriate context’.14 But the fact that some scientists and other
academic commentators supportedDr. Harkonen and expressed concern that his con-
viction punishes legitimate scientific communications,15 suggests that even within the
scientific community it may be difficult to generally define scientific exchange.
Thedifficultyof definingwhat is or is not legitimate scientific exchange, in turn, raises
the question of whether the public health would be served by categorically excluding
certain drug manufacturer communications from FDA oversight. Experience and re-
search suggest that drug manufacturers can use scientific or educational communica-
tions to market their products. Harkonen provides one example. Evidence presented
at Dr. Harkonen’s trial suggested that the data were presented in an inappropriately
positive light in the press release in order to increase off-label sales of the drug. Ad-
ditionally, concerns have been raised about industry-supported Continuing Medical
Education (CME) programs, even when industry sponsors do not expressly control
the content of the CME programs.16 For instance, some (although not all) research
has suggested that industry-supported CME programs place more focus on drug treat-
ments and give more favorable treatment to sponsors’ products than do those that
are not funded by industry, and that industry receives an approximately 3-fold return
on its investment in educational programs.17 Moreover, as other commentators have
13 Cf. United States v. Harkonen, No. C 08-00164 MHP, 2010 WL 2985257, at ∗3 (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2010)
(noting that to evaluate the parties’ arguments ‘it is necessary to provide significant detail about the . . . Phase
III trial’).
14 Bennett et al., supra note 1, at 203.
15 See eg Brief for Scientists and Academics as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Harkonen v. U.S., 2013WL
5915131 (U.S.) (No. 13-180).
16 See eg STAFF OF S. FIN. COMM., 110TH CONG., USE OF EDUCATIONAL GRANTS BY PHARMACEUTICAL
MANUFACTURERS (Comm. Print 2007); INST. OF MED., CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN MEDICAL RESEARCH,
EDUCATION, AND PRACTICE 122-66 (2009).
17 See eg Commercial Sponsorship of Continuing Medical Education: Hearing Before the S. Special Comm. on Ag-
ing, 111th Cong. 111-305 (2009) (statement of Lewis Morris, Chief Counsel, Office of Inspector General,
Department of Health and Human Services) (describing various studies); but seeMichael A. Steinman et al.,
Commercial Influence and Learner-Perceived Bias in Continuing Medical Education, 85 ACAD. MED. 74 (2010)
(finding that rates of perceived bias did not differ between industry-supported and noncommercial CME pro-
grams).
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Regulating drug promotion to promote the public health  5
explained, marketing research suggests that there are emotional and non-conscious
ways to convey information in a persuasive manner.18 Color choice provides one illus-
tration of non-informational means of persuading—for example, green packaging may
lead consumers to conclude that products are environmentally friendly.19This research
indicates that factually and contextually accurate scientific or educational information
may nevertheless be finessed.
This not to say that there is no public health value in drug manufacturers’ scientific
and educational communications. As Bennett and co-authors explain, drug manufac-
turers often have the most extensive and up-to-date information about their products,
and, as a general matter, I agree with the authors that allowing the public to access that
information might have some positive public health effects. But I am more skeptical
of the relative public health value of drug manufacturer communications than the au-
thors appear to be. Given the difficulty of defining a general category of scientific (and
other exempt) communications, and the reality that even communications that meet
Bennett and colleagues’ very reasonable definition of scientific exchange might be ma-
nipulative, ‘scientific exchange’ may not be themost useful line to draw from the public
health perspective.
18 See egMicah L. Berman,Manipulative Marketing and the First Amendment, 103 GEO. L.J. 497, 532 (2015).
19 See id.
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